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Abstract—Extensive adoption of video surveillance, affecting
many aspects of the daily life, alarms the concerned public
about the increasing invasion into personal privacy. Therefore,
to address privacy issues, many tools have been proposed for
protection of personal privacy in image and video. However,
little is understood regarding the effectiveness of such tools
and especially their impact on the underlying surveillance tasks.
In this paper, we propose a subjective evaluation methodology
to analyze the tradeoff between the preservation of privacy
offered by these tools and the intelligibility of activities under
video surveillance. As an example, the proposed method is
used to compare several commonly employed privacy protection
techniques, such as blurring, pixelization, and masking applied
to indoor surveillance video. The results show that, for the test
material under analysis, the pixelization filter provides the best
performance in terms of balance between privacy protection and
intelligibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
The alarming rate at which video surveillance is being
adopted has raised concerns among public and motivated
development of privacy protection tools. Typical techniques
(i.e. filters) used for obscuring personal information in a video
in order to preserve privacy include blurring and pixelization
of sensitive regions or their masking. More advanced privacy
protection techniques have also been developed recently, such
as scrambling [1], encryption of faces in video [2], obscur-
ing [3] and complete removal of the body silhouettes [4],
anonymization [5], etc.
However, there is a noticeable lack of methods to assess
the performance of privacy protection tools and their impact
on the surveillance task. While many evaluation protocols
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and tools (most notably those developed as part of PETS1
workshops and grand challenges) are available to test the
robustness, accuracy, and efficiency of video analytics for
surveillance, little attention has been devoted to the privacy
aspects. Therefore, a formal methodology for evaluation of
the privacy protection filters is needed.
As the typical end user of privacy filters is a human subject,
the ground truth required for evaluating their performance
is also subjective. In this paper, we propose a subjective
evaluation methodology to analyze the tradeoff between the
preservation of privacy offered by privacy protection filters
and the intelligibility of activities under video surveillance. We
focus on several typical use cases of benign and suspicious
behavior in indoor video surveillance, and apply commonly
used privacy protection filters, such as blurring, pixelization,
and masking to obscure the privacy-sensitive regions. Then,
we ask human subjects to evaluate the resulting videos in
terms of degree of privacy preservation and intelligibility of the
surveillance events. The proposed evaluation method allows
to identify the weaknesses of existing privacy protection tools
and provide a reference for evaluation of other techniques.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the evaluation methodology with underlying
dataset and evaluation protocol. In Section III, we focus on
the evaluation criteria, and in Section IV, we discuss the
results of the subjective evaluation. We conclude the paper
with Section V.
II. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
This section describes the evaluation methodology that is
designed for effectiveness assessment of the various visual
filters to protect privacy of individuals on one hand, and their
1IEEE International Workshop on Performance Evaluation of Tracking and
Surveillance (PETS)
impact on the intelligibility of the surveillance task on the
other.
A. Use cases and underlying database
Privacy and surveillance are both heavily context dependent
concepts. Therefore, any evaluation methodology should take
into account the context in which the surveillance task is
performed. In this paper, we focus on a simple use case,
namely, a monitoring situation, without recording, where an
observer (test subject) watches a video of an indoor scene
under surveillance with a single standard definition camera. In
the monitored scene, individuals move in front of the camera,
either behaving normally, or acting abnormally.
To evaluate this use case, we have built a dataset con-
sisting of 9 different video sequences with a duration of 10
seconds each. Different indoor video surveillance scenarios
were considered, such as a person walking towards and away
from the camera (normal scenario), blinking into the camera
(suspicious), and wearing hat, sunglasses, or scarf around the
mouth (suspicious) to hide personal identity. Table I provides
a short description of each video sequence in the database.
TABLE I: Description of the video sequences used for the
evaluation
Seq. 1 White male, sunglasses, walks away and towards the camera
Seq. 2 White female, walks towards the camera, blinks three times
Seq. 3 Asian male, glasses, walks in from the right side, blinks threetimes to the camera
Seq. 4 White male, walks toward the camera, blinks three times
Seq. 5 Asian female, walks towards the camera, blinks three times
Seq. 6 White female, walks toward the camera, blinks three times
Seq. 7 Asian male, glasses, walks toward the camera, blinks threetimes
Seq. 8 White female, walks toward the camera
Seq. 9 White female, wears scarf around her face, walks toward the
camera
To each video sequence in the dataset, a semi-automatic
segmentation and tracking algorithm was applied in order to
obtain a binary mask2, identifying a foreground object of
interest, which not only plays a certain role in the under-
standing of the situation under surveillance, but also may
contain potentially privacy sensitive information. Different
privacy protection filters were then applied to the extracted
foreground objects. Blurring, pixelization, and masking (black
foreground shape covering the region of interest) privacy filters
were selected (see examples in Figure 1) to generate different
versions for each video sequence. Thus, a total of 27 processed
video sequences were produced and used in the subjective
evaluation, as described in the next section.
B. Evaluation protocol
The goal of the subjective evaluation was to assess whether
the detection of the normal or abnormal behaviors in the
scene was possible, while various privacy protection filters
were applied. At the same time, the effectiveness of privacy
protection was assessed, as the identities of the individuals
2MIT annotation tool: http://people.csail.mit.edu/celiu/motionAnnotation/
in the sequences might have been hidden. Particularly, each
subject was asked to watch a video sequence and then answer
to questions presented in Table II.
TABLE II: Questions asked during the assessment
1. What is the gender of
the person?  Female  Male  I don’t know
2. What is the race of the
person?  White  Asian  I don’t know
3. Does the person wear
glasses?  Yes  No  I don’t know
4. Does the person wear
sunglasses?  Yes  No  I don’t know
5. Does the person wear
a scarf?  Yes  No  I don’t know
6. Does the person blink
into the camera?  Yes  No  I don’t know
An important issue to resolve was the memory effect during
viewing, when observation of a video could potentially affect
the evaluation of a following video. In our case, the main con-
cern came from interactions between different versions of the
same video, since different details could be visible in different
video of the same scene obfuscated by different privacy filters.
For instance, observation of a blurred video could provide
information otherwise invisible in the pixelated version of the
same video. Consequently, if the former precedes the latter,
the memory effect could affect the evaluation of the latter.
To avoid such memory effect in the assessment of the
privacy protection and the task performed in video surveil-
lance, each subject was shown each of the 9 contents only
once. To insure that, the 27 processed video sequences were
divided into three separate sessions designated as A, B, and
C, with each session containing 9 sequences including all
the different contents. Furthermore, every session contained
an equal number of blurred, pixelated, and masked video.
Table III illustrates how video sequences were divided into
the these three sessions.
Each session lasted about 5 minutes and was attended by
a different group of 12 subjects, thus, overall 36 subjects
took part in the evaluation. In such an arrangement, every
subject had a balanced overview of the used privacy filters,
which helps avoiding bias in the results. The subjects were
naive viewers of mixed gender (almost equally distributed) and
various nationalities. Subjects’ age was in range from middle
twenties up to late forties.
TABLE III: Arrangement order of the filtered video sequences
into evaluation sessions A, B, and C
Seq. Blurring Pixelization Masking
Seq. 1 A C B
Seq. 2 B A C
Seq. 3 C B A
Seq. 4 A C B
Seq. 5 B A C
Seq. 6 C B A
Seq. 7 A C B
Seq. 8 B A C
Seq. 9 C B A
(a) Original, no filters (b) Blurring
(c) Pixelization (d) Masking
Fig. 1: An example of video sequence (Seq. 9 from Table I) with privacy filters applied
Each video sequence was displayed after a short message
informing the subject that the evaluation for that sequence
was imminent. Subjects were given 25 seconds to respond the
questions in Table II by ticking the corresponding check boxes
in the scoring sheet. They were instructed to give definitive
answers (such as “Yes” or “No”) only if reasonably certain
about the answer, and answer “I don’t know” in all other cases.
The same procedure was repeated for each video sequence
until the end of the session when a message informed the test
subjects that the session was over. Figure 2 displays the photo
demonstrating the test lab and how the subjective tests were
performed.
III. EVALUATION CRITERIA
Given the context dependent nature of privacy and intelli-
gibility, in the surveillance scenario under consideration, the
first three questions from the Table II were assumed to be
relevant to privacy and the last three questions to intelligibility.
Information about gender, somatic traits, and glasses (first
three questions) are privacy related. These characteristics do
Fig. 2: A photo of one of the subjective test sessions
not carry anything unusual, given the surveillance scenario,
while they can be used to identify people in the indoor
environment, and they can be discriminated against based on
these features. On the other hand, blinking three times into the
camera, which looks like sort of a code (at least, it’s an unusual
behavior), sunglasses worn indoor (possibly for hiding eyes),
and scarf around the face (to hide the identity) are considered
unusual and alarming, since either of these characteristics are
not typical for the indoor environment. These unusual features
therefore are set as related to intelligibility and should be
visible to the observers.
Therefore, the following criteria were used for understand-
ing how well a given filter protects privacy. If an observer
correctly answers the privacy related question for a given
video sequence and privacy protection filter, the privacy is not
protected in this case. Incorrect answer or no answer (option
“I don’t know”) would mean that the privacy is preserved.
For intelligibility, on the other hand, a correct answer to
the corresponding question would mean that surveillance task
can be performed successfully, while incorrect or uncertain
answers would lead to the failure of recognizing an important
unusual event.
Such tradeoff between privacy and intelligibility can be
used to compare different privacy protection techniques and
understand how these techniques perform, given various video
contents.
If an observer correctly answers to the privacy related
question, the privacy value is 0, since the privacy was not
protected in this case. Incorrect answer or no answer (option
“I don’t know”) yield 1. Then, the average privacy score of
all three privacy related questions across all test subjects was
computed for each type of filter and each video sequence.
IV. EVALUATION RESULTS
For each privacy filter, the aggregated results are illustrated
on a two dimensional space in Figure 3, with the amount
of privacy preservation and the degree of recognition of
activities under surveillance (i.e., intelligibility), as vertical and
horizontal axes respectively. The privacy score is ranging from
0 (no privacy protection) to 1 (fully protected), which is the
average of the scores of the privacy related questions from the
test subjects, as described in the previous section. Each point
in the figure corresponds to a different video sequence and
a different privacy protection filter. Points corresponding to a
privacy filter are marked with distinguishing point-style.
The best privacy preserving filter would be a blacked out
camera with no video feed, but, in such case, there would
be no surveillance possible and intelligibility would be zero.
Therefore, a usable privacy protection filter should have a
balance between privacy and intelligibility. In an ideal situ-
ation, the evaluation scores for such filter would lie in the top
right corner of the tradeoff graph, having the highest values
of privacy and intelligibility. In practice, however, it means
that a filter with points close to the 45◦ line provides the best
balance between privacy and intelligibility.
Figure 3, with evaluation scores of the typical privacy
filters, demonstrates that blurring filter yields the highest
intelligibility while providing the lowest privacy protection.
Not surprisingly, the masking filter shows the highest privacy
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Fig. 3: Intelligibility vs. privacy for different filters
protection, while having the lowest intelligibility, since a
person from the video sequence is replaced with the black
boundary. However, the highest privacy score for the masking
filter is still below 0.8, which means that at least 20% of
the answers to the privacy questions were still correct. By
looking into details, we noticed that the largest number of
correct answers for masking filter is to the gender question,
which is because people can recognize gender by the shape of
a person in the video. Therefore, the shape of persons’ masks
should be distorted to hide the actual shape of the person.
A surprising result shows pixelization filter demonstrating
high privacy protection while still yielding high degree of the
activities recognition, which makes it the filter with the best
balance of privacy and intelligibility.
It can be noted in Figure 3 that one video sequence demon-
strates an odd results for every filter, having the smallest value
of privacy and a significantly high intelligibility (the points of
each different color with the lowest privacy scores). In this
video, the face of the person walking from a distance was left
visible (unprotected by a filter) just for a couple of frames,
which immediately rendered privacy protection filters useless.
This video sequence indicates that even a slight inaccuracy or
inconsistency in the way the filters are applied can lead to the
complete loss of the privacy protection effort.
Figure 4 demonstrates the effect of different privacy protec-
tion filters on the uncertainty and incorrectness in the answers
of the test subjects. Uncertainty axis reflects the average nor-
malized amount of “I don’t know” answers, which were given
to both privacy and intelligibility questions. Incorrectness is
computed as normalized average of wrong answers, when
subjects were certain but wrong. Each point on the graph
corresponds to one video sequence distorted by one privacy
protection filter. This figure shows masking filter yielding the
largest uncertainty, while blurring filter results in the largest
false positive (incorrectness). Such unbalance indicates that
blurring filter is less applicable in the surveillance scenarios
with little tolerance for false positives. The masking filter on
the other hand would be better in a typical surveillance system
when some uncertainty can be tolerated, i.e., an uncertain
observation can be checked via other means, such as an
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Fig. 4: Uncertainty vs. incorrectness for different filters
additional security check, but false positive is required to be
low.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper defines a methodology for evaluation of pri-
vacy protection tools for video surveillance. In the proposed
evaluation protocol, we focus on two important aspects: (i)
how much of the privacy is protected by such tool and
(ii) how much it impacts the efficiency of the underlying
surveillance task (intelligibility). The pixelization filter shows
the best performance in terms of balancing between privacy
protection and allowing high intelligibility. Masking filter, on
the other hand, demonstrates the highest privacy protection
with the lowest false positives. Future work includes extending
the set of evaluation questions to identify other tradeoffs in
privacy protection. The effect of applying protection tools with
different levels of strength also need to be evaluated. We also
plan to extend the dataset to include both more content and
several additional privacy filtering tools. The complete dataset
used in this paper will be made available to public.
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